Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

2-18-2004

SEQRA Challenges: Court Creates New Rule on Statute of
Limitations
John R. Nolon
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Jessica A. Bacher
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Land Use Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John R. Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, SEQRA Challenges: Court Creates New Rule on Statute of Limitations,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 18, 2004, at 5, http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/692/.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

SEQRA Challenges: Court Creates New Rule on Statute of Limitations
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal
February 18, 2004

John R. Nolon and Jessica A. Bacher
[John Nolon is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, the Director of its
Joint Center for Land Use Studies, and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of
Forestry and Environmental Studies. Ms. Bacher is a Staff Attorney for the Land
Use Law Center at Pace Law School.]
Abstract: The New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, known around
the New York legal community as SEQRA, triggers any time a public action may
have an adverse impact on the environment. The determinations of this process,
intertwined with public actions such as, site plan approvals, variance requests, or
any other land use or public action, are often challenged by those parties who
are unsatisfied with the result. This article discusses the extensive case history
regarding when SEQRA actions are ripe for legal challenge.
***
The issuance of land use and environmental permits by administrative
agencies in New York, at both the state and local levels, typically involves two
distinct determinations. The first is whether the activity meets the substantive
standards of the law and regulations enforced by the agency. The second is
whether the activity may have an adverse impact on the environment. Where
there may be such an impact, the agency makes a “positive declaration” of
environmental impact and requires that an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) be completed. The contents of the EIS are considered by the agency in
approving, conditioning its approval of, or denying the permit. The environmental
review requirement is imposed by the State Environmental Quality Review Act,
known as SEQRA.
The dual nature of this process has led to some confusion in recent years
as to when the statute of limitations is triggered for those who wish to challenge
agency decisions subject to SEQRA. For years, the courts seemed to hold that
parties with standing to challenge agency actions had to wait until the substantive
decision was made to litigate agency determinations. “The general rule under
SEQRA, as established by the case law, is that the moment of ripeness occurs
only when an agency takes its final action approving or disapproving the
underlying proposal.” Michael B. Gerrard, Daniel Ruzow, Philip Weinberg, Envtl.
Impact Rev. in N.Y., § 7.02 (1) (Mathew Bender 2003). That rule appeared to be
changing in recent years and this change has just been confirmed by the Court of

Appeals. See Stop-the-Barge v. Cahill, 2003 N.Y. Lexis 4004 (Court of Appeals
December 2, 2003).
An example of the rule requiring the substantive decision to be “final”
before a SEQRA determination may be litigated is seen in Town of Coeymans v.
City of Albany, 655 N.Y.S.2d 172 (3d Dep’t 1997). Here, the petitioners sought
judicial review of the determination that designated the Department of
Environmental Conservation’s regional office as the lead agency for the review of
a proposed solid waste management facility. The court held that the lead agency
designation was not a “final” determination. Rather, it was, like some other
SEQRA determinations, a preliminary step in the decision making process and,
therefore, not ripe for judicial review. The court stated that to hold otherwise
would subject the entire SEQRA process to unrestrained review that would delay
the process indefinitely. As a corollary, the period of limitations applicable to a
challenge to the lead agency determination does not begin to run until the
environmental review process is complete.
In Stop-the-Barge v. Cahill, 2003 N.Y. Lexis 4004 (Court of Appeals
December 2, 2003), the Court of Appeals held that the issuance of the
Conditional Negative Declaration (CND) was the “final” agency action under
SEQRA and, therefore, triggered the statute of limitations. For agency actions
that are not listed in the SEQRA regulations as Type I actions (which
presumptively may have an adverse impacts on the environment) the agency can
issue a CND. This can be done where possible adverse impacts disclosed on an
Environmental Assessment Form can be sufficiently mitigated by imposing
conditions on the project in the early stage of project review. The conditions
imposed must be practicable and reasonably related to impacts identified in the
record. When a CND is issued, a full EIS is not required and no further
environmental review is necessary. In other words, for SEQRA purposes, the
matter is “final”.
In Stop-the-Barge, New York City Energy (NYCE) submitted a request to
the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for a permit to
install a power generator on a floating barge on the west side of the Wallabout
Channel at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. DEP became the lead agency under
SEQRA and conducted an environmental review of the project. DEP was the
lead agency under the regulations because it had the primary responsibility for
the underlying approval of the power generator project under New York City law.
DEP issued a CND, concluding that the project posed no significant impact to the
environment and no environmental impact statement was required. On February
18, 2000, the CND became final and the SEQRA review was concluded.
As often happens in land use and environmental approvals, another
agency was involved. NYCE had to obtain an air permit under Article 19 of the
Environmental Conservation Law from the State Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC). It was at this stage that Stop-the-Barge, an opposition

group, got actively involved. Opposition to the project led to a DEC hearing and
the petitioners and others submitted extensive written objections to the proposal
on the grounds of inadequate environmental review. Following the hearing, DEC
approved NYCE’s permit application.
The steps in this process relevant to the petitioner’s action challenging the
environmental review included 1. the issuance of a final CND by DEP on
February 18, 2000; 2. DEC’s issuance of the air permit on December 18, 2000;
and 3. the commencement of petitioner’s action challenging the environmental
review process on February 20, 2001. Under C.P.L.R. § 217(1) a cause of action
of this type must be initiated within four months of the action challenged. The
question is which of the actions involved triggered the running of the statute?
The petitioners, Stop-the-Barge, commenced the present action one year
after the CND became final. They claimed that the DEP’s issuance of the CND
was arbitrary and capricious and violated SEQRA. The DEP, in turn, moved to
dismiss the petition as time barred. The Court of Appeals agreed with DEP
relying on Essex County v. Zagata and Gordon v Rush to reach its decision.
In Essex County v Zagata, 91 N.Y.2d 447 (1998), the Court found that
several factors must be considered to determine whether an agency action is
“final”. The first is whether the action imposes an obligation, denies a right or
fixes some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process.
Essex, 91 N.Y.2d at 453. In other words, the agency action is “final” when the
decision maker arrives at a "definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual,
concrete injury." Id. “There must additionally be a finding that the injury
purportedly inflicted by the agency may not be prevented or significantly
ameliorated by further administrative action or by steps available to the
complaining party. If further agency proceedings might render the disputed issue
moot or academic, then the agency position cannot be considered definitive or
the injury actual or concrete." Id. at 453-54.
In Gordon v. Rush, 100 N.Y.2d 236 (2003) the court relied on the Essex
factors to determine whether the issuance of a positive declaration under SEQRA
was “final” and thus ripe for review. A positive declaration of environmental
impact requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement: a costly
and time-consuming enterprise. The Town of Southampton Coastal Erosion
Hazard Board issued its own positive declaration for the project after the DEC
had previously conducted a coordinated review resulting in a negative
declaration, in which the Board had an opportunity but failed to participate.
The court found that the issuance of a positive declaration imposed an
obligation on the applicant, submission of the DEIS, which is an actual injury
because the process requires considerable time and expense. In addition,
further proceedings would not lessen the injury. The court held that the issuance
of the positive declaration and not the assertion of jurisdiction by the Board alone

was a “final” administrative action ripe for judicial review. In disposing of the
matter, the court determined that the Southampton Board should have brought
an Article 78 action challenging the DEC’s issuance of the tidal wetlands permit
upon completion of the coordinated SEQRA review and the issuance of DEC’s
negative declaration. How broadly this case will be applied to the issuance of
positive declarations by lead agencies under SEQRA remains to be seen.
Gordon is some authority for that proposition and Essex and Stop-the-Barge
provide the factors and analysis that must be used to determine finality for the
adjudication of SEQRA determinations such as positive declarations.
In Stop-the-Barge, the court held that the DEP had reached a definitive
position on February 18, 2000, when the public comment period ended because,
at that point, its SEQRA review ended. “[T]he issuance of the CND resulted in
actual concrete injury to petitioners because the declaration essentially gave the
developer the ability to proceed with the project without the need to prepare an
environmental impact statement.” Stop-the-Barge, 2003 N.Y. Lexis 4004 at *7.
“Thus, to the extent that petitioners challenge the conclusions reached by DEP
from its SEQRA review, the period of limitations must be measured at the latest
from the time that the CND became final, on February 18, 2000.” Id.
The CND completed the SEQRA process and waiting ten months to
challenge the process until the issuance of the air permit would be particularly
unreasonable, said the court.
The court found that running the period of
limitations from the issuance of the CND is consistent with the policy of resolving
environmental issues and determining whether an environmental impact
statement will be required at the early stages of project planning. The court
concluded that “[u]nder the circumstances presented [in the case], the CND was
a final agency action for purposes of judicial review of petitioners’ SEQRA claim.”
Id. at *8.
Prior to the Court of Appeals decisions in Gordon v. Rush and Stop-theBarge, the interpretation regarding the statute of limitation for SEQRA challenges
appeared to be well settled: the running of the period of limitations commenced
on the date of the agency’s underlying substantive decision, not completion of
the SEQRA review. In Long Island Pine Barrens Soc. Inc. v. Planning Bd. of the
Town Brookhaven, 78 N.Y.2d 608 (1991), the court held that the statute of
limitation period began to run upon the approval of the preliminary plat and not
from the earlier act that was the last step in the SEQRA process. Two Third
Department cases began to cloud this old rule. In McNeill v. Town Bd., 260
A.D.2d 829 (3d Dept. 1999), the court held that the statue of limitations for
SEQRA challenges began to run from the issuance of the negative declaration.
In City of Saratoga Springs v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Wilton, 279
A.D.2d 756 (3d Dept. 2001), the court again held that the statute of limitation
period began to run from the filing of the SEQRA determination, a negative
declaration. Neither of these cases reached the court of appeals for a final
determination on the issue.

The new rule created in Gordon v. Rush and Stop-the-Barge initiates the
running of the period of limitations when the SEQRA determination is “final”.
This requires those who challenge SEQRA determinations involved in underlying
land use and environmental permits to become involved early and to be diligent
in spotting when the environmental process ends. In Stop-the-Barge, the
petitioners offered no comments regarding the DEP’s issuance of the CND.
Since the project required two permits, one can understand why an opposition
group might conclude that its right to litigate survives until the second permit is
issued. Not so in these circumstances. If the objection is to the adequacy of the
required environmental review, then the matter is “final” and the period of
limitations begins when the CND is finally issued. By analogy, where an agency
issues a negative declaration (its finding that the activity will not have an adverse
impact on the environment), the issuance of the negative declaration will trigger
the statute.
While imposing due diligence burdens on opposition groups, these rules
provide definition for permit applicants and administrative agencies. In these
cases, they now know that SEQRA declarations are immune from attack after the
period of limitations has run following the “final” SEQRA determination.

